A NATIONAL INSTITUTION

The Church of England is a national institution. It is an institution in the everyday sense that it is a part of our national cultural furniture with which most of us are familiar. We may refer to it, with a mixture of affection and exasperation, as the dear old C of E,¹ or we may merely make use of it as a convenience when asked to state our religion for bureaucratic purposes. But it is also an institution in a more formal sense, since institutions can be understood from a social scientific perspective as a category of social system with some unmistakable differentiating features.

Institutions tend to have bureaucratic structures and a long history, but to have survived through many vicissitudes because they have managed to adapt themselves to changing times. The C of E has, over the last half-millennium, survived murderous internal feuds and looming external threats. It has, albeit slowly, adapted to industrialization and post-industrialization, modernity and late-modernity.

Its culture—its beliefs, values, norms, and artefacts—has generally remained sufficiently aligned to the national culture to constitute part of it, but sufficiently distinctive to be able to offer a critique. Consider, for example, the plight of the poor during the Industrial Revolution. Associated with the hierarchical society of traditional rural England to the extent

¹. Furlong, C of E: The State It’s In.
that it was almost synonymous with the Tory party at prayer, the C of E was left standing in the blocks by the urgent response to the new industrial society by the Methodists and elements of its own Evangelical wing. However, new parishes were soon set up in the urban slums, the Christian Socialist movement was born, and both the High Church Oxford Movement and the Evangelicals established missions in the cities.

A century and a half later, the Church's same concern for social justice bucked the liberal free market political orthodoxy by producing the powerful report “Faith in the City.” Or consider the action of Archbishop Runcie, himself a war veteran, who, in the service at St. Paul's Cathedral in commemoration of the Falklands War, prayed for the Argentinian as well as the British dead. This prayer directly critiqued the dominant nationalistic triumphalism led by Prime Minister Thatcher. In both these cases, the C of E was sufficiently in tune with contemporary English society to be able to give powerful expression to its own values without alienating the majority.

Institutions also have relations with other institutions, acquiring thereby precious social capital in terms of legitimacy and authority. As the established church, the C of E has ties with other established national institutions: the monarchy, parliament, and the legal system, for example. It also derives indirect status from these ties. It is worth emphasizing the continuing extent of the legal involvement of the C of E with the state. For example, the monarch has to be in communion with the Church of England. He or she appoints all of the bishops, and the government appoints the vicars of almost 700 parishes. Prisons and the Armed Services have to have C of E chaplains. And, for the nostalgic, there are still twenty-six bishops in the House of Lords, just as there is honey still for tea at Grantchester. Moreover, while the majority of the English population do not now get christened, married, or buried in their national church, let alone attend it regularly, there is little doubt that it will continue to officiate with great sense of occasion and dignity when, for example, the royal family experiences these life events.

Institutions are supported by their own hierarchical structures of authority and systems of control: rules and regulations, disciplinary procedures, policy-making processes, and so on. These enable them to plan, organize, and coordinate actions across the institution and use human and financial resources effectively. The C of E is no exception. Its hierarchy is based on the episcopal system, with archbishops overseeing the provinces of Canterbury and York, bishops overseeing dioceses such as Chelmsford.
or Southwark, clergy overseeing parishes, and uniform governance structures down to and including the level of individual congregations.²

Historically it would be true to say that the bishops have exercised a great deal of power both individually and in concert, although the advent of Synod in 1970 curtailed their influence.³ Synod is, in effect, the C of E’s parliament, and consists of bishops, clergy, and laity. Recent reorganization has seen the introduction of the Archbishop’s Council in an attempt to centralize decision-making processes and improve the effectiveness of Synod.

So the C of E has all the advantages of being an institution: history, legitimacy, authority, culture, structure, and resources. It also has some of the disadvantages. It can be very slow to change. It has frequently adopted the traditional method of kicking difficult issues into touch by establishing a commission to investigate them. One historic case was the Commission on Doctrine. This was designed to address contentious theological issues between the Catholic and Reformed wings of the Church, which were particularly evident after the First World War. It was established in 1922 and reported in its own good time in 1938. At this point the nation and the Church had certain more urgent concerns.

The C of E, like other institutions, also finds it difficult to innovate, partly because its structure and processes are hierarchical, formal, and established, and discourage radical thought. In the 1960s, for example, when radical social and cultural change was abroad, the Church as a whole discouraged such innovators as Bishops Mervyn Stockwood and John A. T. Robinson (of Honest to God fame) and the Reverend Nick Stacey. The very idea that the Church should train its priests, conduct its liturgies, and formulate its stances on ethical issues with a view to engaging with a modern urban post-industrial workforce was at that point a bridge too far for both the Church hierarchy and the laity in general.

And finally, the Church has difficulty in securing a high level of commitment from many of its adherents in terms of time, effort, and money. For, as part of everyone’s cultural furniture, it tends to get taken for granted. It has recently, for example, put additional financial responsibility onto individual congregations, instead of relying so much on its income from its investments, but the response has been decidedly mixed. Congregations that are both committed and wealthy support both themselves and the institution generously (although some have used their financial power as a

². www.churchofengland.org/aboutus.
political lever to influence diocesan policy). The poorer parishes, and also those individual adherents who perceive the Church as a public institution that provides various services that they need at different points in their lives, are less able, or less inclined, to demonstrate their commitment in financial terms.

So given these pros and cons of its status as an institution, how does the C of E measure up at present? A general conclusion based on two excellent recent reviews of the evidence⁴ might run as follows: like most other contemporary institutions, its number of committed adherents is in decline; but it is currently achieving greater public prominence. If we consider membership and regular attendance figures as criteria, then the picture is indeed a grim one.⁵ Numbers have been declining over a long period, but especially since the 1960s, with an apparent acceleration of decline in the 1980s and 1990s. Some, however, have detected a recent slowing in the rate of decline, particularly within the theologically Evangelical wing of the church. According to the English Church Census of 2005, in 1998 980,000 Anglicans worshipped regularly, whereas in 2005 the figure had decreased to 871,000. During this same period, mainstream or orthodox Evangelical Anglicans increased from 73,000 to 77,000; Charismatic Evangelicals remained constant at 115,000; and broad church Evangelicals decreased from 121,000 to 105,000. Of the 160 largest churches in the C of E with a membership of over 350, 83 percent are Evangelical. Also, attendance at cathedral services has increased markedly.

On the other hand, at least half of English people still say that they believe in God.⁶ This has led Grace Davie⁷ to describe the nation as “believing but not belonging.” Perhaps, she speculates, English believers (but not belongers) want the minority belongers to act vicariously on their behalf and maintain the institution, to which they are emotionally attached, and upon which they depend in time of personal or national need.⁸

However, the more fundamental question is: by what criteria should a national institution be evaluated? Clearly, at the congregational level of analysis, membership and attendance figures are part, but part only, of an

⁴. Woodhead and Catto, Religion and Change in Modern Britain; Davie, Religion in Modern Britain.
⁶ www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu.
⁷. Davie, Religion in Britain since 1945.
⁸. Davie, Religion in Modern Europe.
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appropriate set of criteria. But at the institutional level, success criteria should surely relate to the effectiveness of the C of E within national, and, I will argue, global society.

This response begs some questions, of course: for example, what is it that the C of E has to contribute that is distinctive, and how does it need to relate to other societal institutions? A response to the first question might be that it directs the nation towards a transcendent perspective and its implied ethical imperatives, or, in theological terms, that it presents and represents God within society. In particular, it has consistently spoken for those without a voice, the poor and marginalized. Such a function clearly reflects the differentiation of religion from other social systems and its unique purpose and role. Differentiation of this nature is a central feature of modernity and secularization.⁹

However, the attribution of these functions specifically to religion also implies, as Durkheim and others have argued,¹⁰ that it can be seen as an element of civil society, integrated within it to a degree. Hence the C of E is likely to engage in relationships with a far wider range of social institutions than just the monarchy and parliament, cited above. For example, it is closely concerned with the institution of marriage and the family; the economic system and the distribution of wealth and resources; the provision of medical and social services; the education system; other Christian denominations and other religions and faith groups; and with music and the visual and performing arts.

The fundamental feature of all social systems is that they position themselves somewhere on a continuum between, at the one unsustainable extreme, total differentiation from other systems, and at the other, total integration with them (and therefore non-existence as a separate entity). By their very nature, institutions are normally likely to be located towards the integration end of the continuum. However, if they are to fulfill a unique role, they will also have to maintain a considerable degree of differentiation. For example, to contribute a prophetic element to the promotion of distributive and procedural justice, the C of E needs to differentiate itself as being more concerned with justice issues than are, for example, commercial corporations or the government of the day; and as having the moral authority to critique existing practice. However, such authority depends

upon, among other things, the C of E maintaining a good reputation for justice in its own practices and processes.

This emphasis on moral authority and reputation highlights the importance of public perceptions. In a late-modern and intensely mediated social system, it is difficult to distinguish the actions of a social institution such as the C of E from perceptions of it. Indeed, much of its activity is actively concerned with gaining and shaping media attention. Other activities may not be primarily directed at the media, but because it is a prominent national institution, it always offers a focus for media attention. Hence we see the apparently contradictory situation of increased public visibility at the same time as decreasing membership.

WELBY AND WONGA

A detailed example illustrates both the opportunities for, and the complexities of, social interventions. The whole episode was essentially a media event. The relatively newly installed Archbishop of Canterbury, Justin Welby, who before his ordination worked in the oil industry, was interviewed by the magazine Total Politics. He announced that he had told the chief executive of Wonga, the payday loan company that charges 5,853 percent interest per annum, “we’re not in the business of trying to legislate you out of existence, we’re trying to compete you out of existence.” He said that the medium for this commercial assault was to be the credit unions (not-for-profit and usually locally-based loan organizations which are limited by law to charging no more than 26.8 percent interest per annum). He offered the premises of 15,000 churches for use by credit unions, and volunteers to help run them. And, perhaps rashly in hindsight, he said “we’re putting our money where our mouth is; we’re starting a Church of England credit union.”

This announcement did not feature particularly prominently in the national press or broadcasting media. The next day, however, it was the first story in the BBC news and achieved at least a page of coverage in both quality and mid-range newspapers. Why? Because the Financial Times had conducted some investigative reporting to the effect that the C of E’s pension fund had invested in Accel Partners, a United States venture capital company that has itself invested heavily in Wonga. The headlines included “C of E admits investing £1m in Wonga” (The Guardian), and “Welby fury

as C of E pension fund profits from Wonga” (The Daily Mail). The BBC interviewed Welby, who admitted that the episode was very embarrassing. Its religious affairs correspondent suggested that the previous day’s announcement had been “a bit of a coup in the Church and the outside world,” but that the Church’s investment had been “a serious blunder.” The story was now the Church’s embarrassment, not the Archbishop’s initiative—apparently a much more newsworthy event.

The church’s immediate task was now one of damage limitation. Welby continued to maintain that his plan was to undercut payday loans by building up the credit union movement, but commended Wonga’s professionalism and said that it was better than many other payday lenders. The Archbishop’s office, Lambeth Palace, expressed gratitude to the Financial Times for bringing to its attention this serious inconsistency of which we were unaware. We will be asking the assets committee of the Church Commissioners to investigate how this has occurred, and to review the holding in this pooled investment vehicle. We will also be requesting the Church Commission to investigate whether there are any other inconsistencies [with the C of E’s ethical investment policy], as normally all investment policies are reviewed by the Ethical Investment Advisory Group (EIAG).

The implication of this statement is that one arm of the C of E structure, Lambeth Palace, had been let down by another, the Church Commission, and was seeking to shift the blame away from the Archbishop.

The field was now open for a wide range of parties to seek to benefit from the Church’s and the Archbishop’s discomfiture. The coalition government, and its Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, were responsible for the policy of austerity that resulted in a greater demand for payday loans. Yet they had consistently refused to legislate a cap on interest rates on loans, but rather made the government’s social fund for those in dire need more difficult to access. Osborne, however, affirmed a “huge amount of respect for Justin Welby,” recalling that he had appointed him to the parliamentary Banking Standards Commission, and asserting that he agreed with much of what he was proposing. Vince Cable, the Business Secretary, said “The Archbishop of Canterbury has hit the nail on the head.” The chief executive of Wonga said that Welby was an exceptional individual and that they had had a meeting of minds on many big issues. He himself was, he
stressed, “all for better consumer choice,” to the extent that he cheekily published Wonga’s version of the Ten Commandments.

This mixture of patronising praise and affirmations of basic agreement indicates that those standing to lose money or power were convinced that they now had nothing to fear. The Archbishop could not now respond feistily to Wonga’s chief executive that there was no consumer choice to be made when you did not know where your next meal or the week’s rent was coming from, and when the banks either would not lend to you, or else charged exorbitant overdraft rates. Moreover, the financial commentators agreed that credit unions would be no match for the payday lenders. They are often very local and inadequately capitalized, to the extent that from January 2012 through to July 2013, at least fourteen of them collapsed, many citing bad debts as the cause. Wonga, in contrast, announced revenues of £185 million in 2011 and spent £16 million on advertising.

So the Archbishop was temporarily undone by the failure of the bureaucratic institutional structures of the C of E to anticipate the likely investigative response of the media to his initiative. The government and the loans industry could then safely use their professed agreement with him to ward off criticism and present a sympathetic front while avoiding meaningful action. Further, it is possible that he did not assemble in advance a sufficiently powerful set of allies to support him. As Lord Glasman, a Labour peer, argued, Islam has a strong opposition to usury, and indeed a Muslim Newcastle United footballer refused initially to wear his shirt sponsored by Wonga. The Roman Catholic Church, too, has an ongoing tradition of privileging the poor.

But all was certainly not lost. The C of E held its nerve and supported its Archbishop, who established a Task Group on Credit Unions and the Financial Sector. This is chaired by the eminent financial expert Hector Sants, who pointed out that the C of E “has the best branch network in the country.” The Church, if it appreciates sufficiently the mediated nature of its social environment, will demonstrate that it is in tune with a solid ethical strand of mainstream social values and has made a good choice of issue to contest. This will be a valuable antidote to its perceived discrimination against gays and women, where it has recently been differentiating itself so far from other social institutions and public sentiment as to risk its status as a valued societal institution (of which much more in later chapters). But

success on this issue, and more generally, will require a careful weighing up of the benefits of being part of the establishment on the one hand, and the opportunities for prophetic action and multiple alliances provided by full involvement in civil society on the other.

As a postscript to this story, in October 2014 Wonga was required by the Financial Conduct Authority to write off loans to the value of £220 million for 330,000 borrowers, on the grounds that the company had not checked adequately that these customers were financially capable of repaying their loans. The Almighty certainly moves in mysterious ways.

**TWO MOVEMENTS**

Movements are very different from institutions. Indeed, they frequently define themselves as being their polar opposite. This is partly because institutions are associated with continuity, whereas movements are about change. Of course, the change they desire is not necessarily progressive. Frequently, movements, especially religious movements, are reactionary, seeking to recapture an earlier golden era in contrast to today’s godless secularism, which, they argue, has infected historic institutions, including the Church. Certainly one of the movements which I describe is reactionary in this sense. Calvinists and Charismatics are both movements within the Evangelical wing of the C of E. Both also have adherents who are not Anglicans. Indeed, in the case of the Charismatics, only a small proportion of movement adherents are of that denomination. While this book is concerned with these movements as they operate within the C of E, they are both much more widely distributed than this, a context which I will describe in the next chapter.

Now many of the adherents of these movements are likely to angrily deny this description of themselves. They are in no sense “movements,” they may argue, considering the term to have a political, if not devious, connotation. They are merely following God’s will and doing what He expects of them. And they will probably also object to the labels that I have unilaterally attached to them. But my perspective is that of a social scientist: to demonstrate the existence of a social movement of any sort requires evidence of more or less organized collaboration of individuals and groups in pursuit of a program of action, and I will provide such evidence in the rest of this book. Movements have their own cultures and their own organization, both of which can be investigated empirically. As for the labels,
Calvinist and Charismatic, they do not claim to do justice to the niceties of theological disputation, but at least they bear some relation to the movements’ stated origins and aims.

While I adopt a social scientific approach to defining and evidencing movements within the C of E, the two movements that I identify are also among the three categories described in an influential review of the Evangelical wing of the C of E\textsuperscript{14} published ten years ago. Evangelicals are sub-categorized by Graham Kings into conservative (my “Calvinists”), open, and charismatic, and the similes of canal, river, and rapids, respectively, are used effectively. Kings’s criteria for distinguishing these three are historical and theological rather than sociological and psychological, but the outcome is the same.

Unlike religious institutions, movements tend to concentrate on one or two clearly defined aims. So, the movement which I have labelled Calvinist has as its stated purpose the preservation and propagation of Reformed doctrinal truth. Charismatics, on the other hand, seek above all else to convert others to certain forms of spiritual experience and vitality. Of course, they would contest these aims, which I have presented in such an over-simplified way. Calvinists insist in their self-presentations on offering lengthy summaries of the doctrines that they wish to preserve, and claim to be the true mainstream. Charismatics express the wish to revitalise the spiritual life of individual Christians, the church, the nation, and indeed the world.

But organized they certainly are. Although they demonstrate less of the hierarchical and rule-governed structures of institutions, the very process of organizing tends towards institutionalization (as Weber emphasized). For example, their appointment of professional staff, registration as charities, establishment of boundaries, and codification of processes and practices all threaten to weaken the “fire in the belly,” the motivation derived from a strong culture and social identity. The experience of the transcendent becomes institutionalized, and people can now be religious by means of ritual, precepts, and tradition. However, the form of organization that both movements have embraced currently remains sufficiently distinct from institutional structures to encourage motivation and commitment. (Please note, I am distinguishing the \textit{form} of organization that the movements take as a whole from organizational \textit{groups} that constitute an element within this form.)

\textsuperscript{14} Kings, “Canal, River, and Rapids.”
Institutions and Movements

The four basic elements of the organizational form common to both movements are as follows: clerical formation, local congregations, leading clergy, and organizational groups. The relationships between these elements constitute each movement from an organizational perspective. First, the professional formation of clergy is vital to the movements’ success. In many cases, students have been attracted to a particular version of the faith and to a clerical vocation at university, where various student societies and university churches exercise a profound effect on their intellectual and spiritual development. They then receive their theological training at a college that promotes and instills the movement’s culture, for example, Oak Hill. There are close ties between these colleges and large and wealthy local congregations (e.g., St. Helens Bishopsgate, Holy Trinity Brompton), which provide work experience and starter appointments.

These congregations are often led by movement leaders, and also develop future leaders. Movement leaders are nearly all ordained clerics, but may increasingly be professional officers of organizational groups rather than rectors or vicars of congregations. The latter are enabled to spend much of their time on movement activities rather than on parish work by the additional clergy and other paid staff whom the congregation employs. Congregations offer facilities and resources to organizational groups with which they are associated (for example, St. Marks Battersea Rise and GAFCON).

Organizational groups are differentiated from each other in a variety of ways. They may, for example, concentrate upon one element of the movement’s main aim (for example, Anglican Mainstream and Soul Survivor), or be particularly associated with a powerful local congregation (Proclamation Trust, Alpha). Some are long-established and have changed their aims and strategies over time (the Church Society). Others have been recently founded specifically to further the movement’s purposes (Anglican Mission in England). Most have formal statements of purpose, trustees, and/or a council, and business meetings and conferences. Nearly all have effective websites and media communications. But every one of them is dependent for its survival and success upon the other three elements of the movement: they all need a continuing supply of ideologically committed leaders and wealthy and large congregations.

It is difficult to overstate the complexity of the interconnections within each movement. For example, as I will demonstrate, movement leaders frequently hold office in more than one of the movement’s organizational
Warfare and Waves

groups. Wealthy congregations support the conferences and festivals of organizational groups. Leaders have shared the same formation and frequently preach or teach at each other’s churches or organizational group’s conferences. All repeatedly invoke the same past heroes of the movement, and quote the same key verses of the Bible. The web sites of each organizational group cross-reference the others’ events and the media headlines they have achieved. This degree of movement integration is particularly evident in the Calvinists.

Other noteworthy common features are, first, the extent to which the movements are clerically led. It is not surprising, then, that their aims are internally focussed on the church, for Calvinists on doctrine and governance, and for Charismatics on worship. Second, the degree of flux within each movement is considerable. In particular, organizational groups are formed or re-formed and then fade away, while leaders rise and fall. And third, as I will elaborate in the next section, the impact which these movements can have on the institution to which they both belong, the C of E, is considerable.

While their organizational form is common, however, their culture and strategy certainly are not. Different aims and different histories ensure a wide variation. With their aim of preserving and propagating Reformed doctrine, it is hardly surprising that Calvinists have developed a culture strongly focussed on beliefs. If cultures are an amalgam of beliefs, values, norms of behavior, and artefacts, then the first of these constituent elements is culturally dominant for Calvinists. Their values, norms, and artefacts are, they consider, all derived from, and driven by, their doctrinal beliefs, in particular by their emphasis on the final authority of the Bible. Charismatics, on the other hand, emphasize practices, in particular their mode of ecstatic worship. This informs their doctrinal emphasis on the Holy Spirit, and the high value they place upon spontaneity and spiritual gifts. The leaders of both movements, however, would probably wish to argue that their values, norms, and artefacts are all derived from their belief in the Bible, the Word of God.

In terms of strategy, the movements again differ fundamentally. Returning to the basic social dialectic between differentiation and integration, Calvinists seek to differentiate themselves as sharply as possible from other movements, especially those that are somewhat similar, and with whom they might sometimes be confused. For example, they are usually dismissive of Charismatics, even though these, like themselves, are on the Evangelical
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wing of the C of E. At the same time, they seek to be as homogeneous as possible within their movement—diversity is not encouraged, especially of belief, but also of values and practice. This combination, of differentiation without and homogeneity within, is a recipe for an extremely strong social identity. Movement adherents have clear models, in the persons of their fellow adherents and leaders, of who they are and should be; and they have equally clear examples in other movements of who they are not, and should not be. The potential for conflict based upon an us-versus-them worldview is clear, as is the strength of motivation, deriving from a single dominant social identity, to pursue it.

The strategy of Charismatics is not nearly so close to the differentiation end of the scale. They are not so concerned to establish boundaries between themselves and other movements, but, rather, to enlarge and enliven the spiritual experience of their adherents, and to make such gifts of the Spirit available to others. For example, they welcome charismatic Roman Catholics into the movement. They do not particularly stress their social identity as belonging to the movement. Rather, they are much more concerned with the personal identity and uniqueness of each adherent in their very intimate relationship with God, especially in those moments of ecstasy which are such a central feature of their worship. On the other hand, identification with the local congregation with whom these experiences are enjoyed may be strong (“I’m an HTB [Holy Trinity Brompton] person,” they might say). Thus they enjoy the benefits of both a personal and unique individual identity, and also congregational and small group social identities.

Compared to institutions, then, movements in general, and these two in particular, have contrasting strengths and weaknesses. They are flexible enough in their organizational form to be able to adapt rapidly and innovatively to changing situations. They are focussed in their aims, and continuously develop a powerful supporting narrative with which to attract and inspire adherents. Their strategies differ in terms of their relations with other social systems, and so they provide different forms of identity for their followers which both, nevertheless, give a strong sense of an “us,” united in making change.

However, movements tend to lack the resources of legitimacy and authority that institutions typically possess, and also the more concrete

resources of financial and organizational structure, processes, and policies. Hence Calvinists, for example, strive for reputational credit by gaining a media profile through engineered conflict and drama. The media are consequently saturated with threats of schism and pleas of persecution. Or they may engage in protest or symbolic actions, such as establishing a “Third Province” in the UK, to gain visibility and sustain morale. In so doing, they may alienate potential allies, adding to the inherent difficulty that they all experience in compromising the purity of their aim by collaborating with others whose priorities may differ from their own. Calvinists run the risk, in other words, of finishing up in sectarian isolation.

INSTITUTIONS AND MOVEMENTS

So what is the range of possible relationships between institutions and movements? The most obvious relationship from a rational perspective is one of mutual support. Clearly, the two types of social system have different strengths, which taken together are complementary: structure, legitimacy, and resources allied to innovation, focus, and commitment. Not only are their strengths complementary: they also address each other’s weaknesses. However, it is seldom easy for institutions, entwined in their national or regional culture and associated with continuity, to collaborate effectively with movements, whose *raison d'être* is change. This problem was clearly evident even at the very beginnings of Christianity, when the Church of Rome rapidly formalized the flames of inspired enthusiasm.17

One possible outcome is that the movement achieves its desired effect while remaining within the institution, and then slowly becomes incorporated and domesticated within it, becoming institutionalized itself. Thus the movement gains its objective, at least to a degree, and the institution probably benefits thereby. The Jesuit Order within the Roman Catholic Church is an example. Alternatively, the movement outgrows the institution where it originated, becoming impatient with its parent’s failure to change in the desired direction. Christianity itself was a sect of this nature, driven primarily by St. Paul despite others’ efforts to incorporate it into Judaism. Instead, it became in time a separate institutionalized religion. The separation of Methodism from the C of E represents another example.

17. Von Campenhausen, *Ecclesiastical Authority and Spiritual Power in the Church of the First Three Centuries.*
Both of these outcomes, incorporation or separation, appear relatively benign to the religious social system as a whole, since either existing institutions change and adapt, or else new movements and institutions are added. In the ubiquitous language of modern management, they are both win-win outcomes. Other forms of relationship may be less favorable, however. A frequent habit of institutions has been to label movements heretical, and actively persecute them. This deprives institutions of possible innovative and adaptive changes, and discourages future innovation, since very unpleasant things have often happened to “heretics.” Alternatively, institutions seek to neutralise movements by agreeing with them regarding their aims, but doing little or nothing to help them succeed. In the early days of the movement for women’s ordination, the C of E adopted this tactic.

Or else the boot is on the other foot, with a movement parasitically using an institution as a resource to support its aims, a convenient base from which to operate, without regard for the institution’s integrity or survival. Movements may simply use an institution as the battleground on which they can engage with other movements that they treat as hostile. Or they may treat the institution itself as the enemy, sometimes even while using its resources and remaining in its employment, professing that their objective is really to save it from itself. The Calvinists, I will argue, have just such a relationship with the C of E.

Which of these forms of relationship best describe that between the C of E and the movements within it in the past and at present, and which are likely to predominate in the future? Any convincing answer to this question may serve to predict the longer term prospects of both institution and movements. The story of the past is vigorously contested, because different parties wish to represent and justify the present situation in terms of a mythical history. An informed construction of the present, on the other hand, will require a detailed investigation of the movements and how they operate within the institution, which is the topic of the main body of this book. And speculation about the future must rest, if it is to have any legitimacy at all, on our views of the past and the present.

VERSIONS OF CHURCH OF ENGLAND HISTORY

So how do the different parties represent the history of the C of E and its relationships with the movements within it? The C of E itself likes to construct its story in institutional terms, portraying itself as a unifying national
spiritual influence and bulwark. Admitting the turbulent beginnings of its Protestant phase of existence, it nevertheless presents its main story as that of a tolerant, moderate, and peaceful 'Broad Church,' maintaining the balance between its two historic wings, the Catholic and the Reformed, both of which it values, and out of which it was born. Its heroes are such unifying figures as Hooker, who gave theological justification for the Broad Church by proposing that its authority came from Scripture, tradition, and reason. Archbishop William Temple is its twentieth-century iconic figure. Its favorite periods in its history were, perhaps, the eighteenth century, when its parochial system provided the essential social glue for a largely rural nation; and the mid to late nineteenth century when its Evangelical wing in particular was heavily involved in social reform.

The movements, on the other hand, each cherish a very different historical account of the C of E. The Calvinists see Reformation London as a colony of Geneva, and the English Reformation as basically unfinished business. Their early heroes are Calvin, Cranmer, and John Knox, together with the martyrs Latimer and Ridley. A landmark in the Calvinist version of the history of the C of E is the publication of the Thirty-Nine Articles in 1571, which were based on Cranmer's earlier Forty-Two Articles, and were essentially a statement of the C of E's doctrinal position as distinguished from that of the Roman Catholic Church. Their Calvinist insistence on predestination (the idea that God chooses His followers rather than the reverse), and their discarding of such Catholic sacraments as ordination of the clergy and marriage, render the Articles an ideal flagship for today's Calvinists (but a difficult inheritance for the C of E itself). The Calvinist account concentrates on the early history of the English Reformation and the Puritans, who sought to complete it. It represents the following centuries in terms of a faithful few keeping alive the true Reformed flame. Their recent heroes are John Stott, Jim Packer, and Dick Lucas, all Anglican clergymen who are essentially the fathers of the UK movement in its present form, its previous generation of leaders.

The Charismatic version of C of E history emphasizes, as one might predict, the freeing up of worship from the control of the rituals of the Catholic Church in the Reformation. However, Charismatics have a major difficulty in that, like the Roman Catholic church from which they were to separate, the Reformers, both Calvinist and Lutheran, believed that the charismatic gifts of apostolic days were unnecessary now that the

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Institutional Church was in place. True, some of the Puritans of Oliver Cromwell’s Commonwealth embraced a “baptism of the Spirit,” but they soon left the Church of England to form dissenting congregations. Other groups that included ecstatic forms of worship, the Huguenots, Quakers, Moravians, and Methodists, had relatively little impact on the C of E. Rather, the Charismatic movement in the C of E emphasizes its origins in the second half of the twentieth century, and claims as its heroes stalwarts of the immediately previous generation to the present leadership: Michael Harper, David Watson, and David Pytches, who were influenced primarily by their personal experiences of American preachers, congregations, organizations, and denominations. The basic theme of their story is spiritual revival, especially the revival of church institutions.

Thus, in marked contrast to the Calvinists, whose emphasis on Anglican doctrine necessarily leads them to formulate an historical account of the English Reformation, the Charismatics looked back to apostolic times for legitimacy, but to much more recent history for their foundation story. Rather than emphasizing a historical base in the Reformed C of E, they treat that institution merely as the home in which they find themselves.

It is hardly surprising that movements each construct a historical account that accords with, and promotes, their own aims and preoccupations. Professional historians, however, present a different version. While the Tudor and Stewart periods in particular are subject to a great deal of scholarly dispute, there is considerable agreement that the Reformation in England was in no way a short period of turbulence followed by a long calm voyage of moderation and peace. On the contrary, the bishops of the newly formed C of E destroyed the products of “popery” just as eagerly as did the Puritans later. The English Reformers actually killed more Catholics than any other Protestant church in Europe, all in the name of truth. The response in kind under the Catholic Queen Mary, and subsequent further iconoclastic retaliation by the regicidal Puritans, demonstrate that England was just as violent in its religious conflicts as was continental Europe.

Even the Restoration of the monarchy and the institutionalization of the C of E did not stop persecution of those of the Roman Catholic faith or of a more general Catholic disposition if they failed to conform to its strict requirements regarding liturgy and doctrine. The late eighteenth century brought the social upheavals of the Industrial Revolution, and the ultimate secession of the Methodists. Next, the powerful response of

the nineteenth-century C of E Evangelicals to the injustices of industrial capitalism and Empire\textsuperscript{20} stimulated an equally powerful reaction to modernity in the Oxford Movement. Its leaders, steeped in Romanticism, saw the C of E as part of the historic Catholic church (not the Roman Catholic Church). It was certainly not a mere Reformed church introduced and sponsored by the state. The Oxford Movement found the Thirty-Nine Articles impossible to accept, and reintroduced many historic practices into the liturgies in their churches.

The clashes between the two movements, Evangelical and Catholic, were of course derived from the compromises of the seventeenth century which had gradually brought the era of violent persecution to an end. They continued into the twentieth century, and were made more public by the increasingly democratic structures of the C of E. Efforts at compromise were defeated, for example, in the case of the proposed revision of the Book of Common Prayer, where both Evangelicals and Catholics allied to get the proposal defeated in Parliament in 1928 because it satisfied neither of them. And, as I will describe more fully later, the same alliance of convenience has been used more recently to contest the ordination of women clergy and bishops. If these activities are construed as a case of the tail wagging the dog, then it is an extremely powerful and politically engaged tail.

So overall, the history of the C of E has to be seen as a story of internal conflict. Movements with incompatible aims and beliefs have sought to dominate the institution at each other’s expense. The recent conflicted term of office of Archbishop Rowan Williams, then, should not be seen as in any sense atypical.

**THE ELEPHANT IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND CRYPT**

The historical context is not, however, the only perspective important to the understanding of the C of E. Its present positioning vis-à-vis the elephant in the crypt, globalization, is also of profound importance. In what sense, if any, is the C of E a global institution? To what extent are the Calvinists and Charismatics within the C of E also adherents of global movements? And why does it matter what the answers are to these questions? To stretch a metaphor to breaking point, can we quietly continue to feed and water the elephant in the crypt, or will it stamp its feet, trumpet loudly, and bring

\textsuperscript{20} Edwards, *A Concise History of English Christianity*.
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the whole historic edifice crashing to the ground as it breaks out into the wider world?

The nature of attempted answers to these questions depends upon the perspective from which one approaches the continuing process of globalization. If that perspective is primarily based on a political/economic worldview, then we might continue, with Francis Fukuyama,\(^\text{21}\) to expect the ultimate universal triumph of liberal democracy, accompanied by free-market capitalism and consumerism. Ideological struggle will be replaced by economic calculation, Fukuyama predicted regretfully, imagination and idealism by “centuries of boredom.”

Other political/economic scenarios have naturally been proposed, for example, the continued increase in power and wealth of corporations, but this time at the expense of liberal democracy, rather than as its consequence. But all such political/economic perspectives necessarily construe other social systems as of secondary importance, mere outcomes of these more fundamental processes. Religion and nationalism, for example, were, for Fukuyama, merely reactionary and dying convulsions against the inevitable growth of universal democracy and freedom.

A properly social scientific perspective rejects such a privileging of political and economic ideology. However, it also dismisses any attempt to construe the world entirely in terms of culture and cultural difference. One prominent such account is that of Samuel Huntington,\(^\text{22}\) who argued that civilizations are the largest and most important social and cultural unit in existence. Civilizations are deeply historically rooted, and religion is their principle defining feature. Indeed, Huntington’s names for two of his seven civilizations are religious: Hindu and Islamic. So profound are the differences between civilizations that conflict between them frequently occurs at their points of contact. Twenty years ago, Huntington characterized the global scenario as follows: “A West at the peak of its power confronts non-West that increasingly have the desire, the will, and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways.”\(^\text{23}\) The most profound conflict of our times, he argues, is between the Western and Islamic civilizations.

Both of these still influential perspectives privilege particular social systems, political/economic or cultural/civilizational, in their accounts. As a consequence, religion occupies a secondary position for both of them. For

\(^{21}\) Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man.*
\(^{22}\) Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.*
Fukuyama it is a reactionary spasm against liberal democracy. Clearly, in a democracy people have the freedom of religious choice, but this is a private and personal matter, runs the argument. Religion is, from this perspective, another consumerist option. For Huntington, on the other hand, religion is typically a justification of and a motive for conflict between civilizations. It provides the opportunity for the divisive identities of “us versus them,” which underpin sectarian strife.

The basic dynamic of social systems, however, is the dialectical opposition of differentiation and integration. Every system maintains some sort of equilibrium between these poles. The story of modernity, of which globalization is the culminating and powerful expression, is partly one of increasing differentiation of social systems. Science, religion, nation states, economics and commerce, the arts, the law, and other social systems too, have all established their separate identities. They all have their own assumptions and beliefs, values, and norms of behavior, and specialist languages. They each concentrate on a primary purpose. None of them has any privileged position from an analytic perspective. A proper analysis of globalization is therefore theoretical and descriptive rather than ideological.

At first, this process of differentiation occurred at more local levels, but today all of these systems may be considered global in scope. There is, for example, no longer Chinese science and Western science, just science. Clearly, then, while differentiation is continuing apace (e.g., more scientific disciplines are continually being created), integration has also occurred (e.g., the professed assumptions, values, and practices of science are now the same everywhere). Differentiation is into ever more specialized social systems; integration, ultimately, is now into global ones. The dialectical poles, the “local” and the global, are now further apart than they have ever been.

So one characteristic of globalization is that it is a process that continually oscillates between the global and the local, between the processes of integration and differentiation. The ecstatic experiences of the Toronto Blessing were a partially new form of charismatic worship (differentiation), but they soon influenced practices in a wide range of religious settings throughout the world (integration). This continuous dialectical process has been immensely facilitated by the second feature of globalization: its

25. Robertson, Globalization, Social Theory, and Global Culture.
People are socially connected worldwide as information, ideas, symbols, goods, money, jobs, and indeed, people themselves, move across national and geographical boundaries. It is this connectivity that permits highly differentiated social groups to create and maintain themselves, but at the same time allows global movements to develop based on disparate groups sharing a common agenda.

A final feature of any adequate social scientific account of globalization has to be its reflexive nature. People are now aware of the world as a single system, of the great global sub-systems such as religion, and of themselves as social participants in, and reproducers of, these social systems. Such notions as universal human rights, religious freedom, human security, the common good, and the rule of law could not be popularly held unless this (self)-awareness were present. People are also aware of an important implication of a global social system: that it depends upon relationships between its sub-systems if it is to function. Capitalist corporations, national governments, science and technology, and religion, for example, are perceived to need to collaborate in addressing issues of resource scarcity and distributive injustice.

**IS THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND GLOBAL?**

Against this global context, the account earlier in the chapter of the C of E and two of the movements within it appears at first sight to be irredeemably local and parochial. The sense of place and of particularity feels overwhelming. To what extent, we may ask, has the C of E recognized its new context and entered the globalization process?

As an institution, it was reconfigured in a unique historical situation (the English Reformation) and retained features peculiar to itself: a very local “beginning.” However, as part of the subsequent imperial project, it engaged in missionary activity throughout the British Empire. This may have given the impression of a global reach for a local church, but for all its breadth (“wider, still, and wider”), the Empire was still not truly global. Moreover, while the British missionaries of the nineteenth century sought to retain control over the establishment and development of Anglican churches in the colonies, locals fought hard to have their traditional religious beliefs and practices incorporated into their new colonial churches. This resulted in frequent local practices such as polygamy, miraculous

healing, and exorcism from demonic possession becoming accepted, or at least tolerated in the missionary church, particularly in Africa.

However, while the colonial Anglican churches of the Empire were each ultimately established separately and with their own constitution, all of them were episcopal in their governance and parochial in their organization. As the Empire gradually disappeared, they became members of the Anglican Communion, in fellowship with each other but led by the Archbishop of Canterbury as “first among equals.” Today their archbishops represent churches from rural, industrializing, and post-industrial nations located wherever the British Empire left its deep footprint. There are thirty-six member churches in the Anglican Communion, comprising around eighty million members, and their leaders meet every ten years at the Lambeth Conference.

Thus, in the everyday usage of the term, the Anglican Communion, though not the C of E, might be considered global in its extent; it is at least represented in every continent. But from the social scientific perspective outlined above, it clearly is not global. Neither its ideas nor its people are truly connected worldwide, since membership and organization is largely limited to the former Empire. This historic limitation is associated with an established church still tied to the original imperial power. And there remains a reminder of that imperialism in the historic but changing superior status of the C of E and its archbishop within the Communion.

Moreover, another feature of globalization seems to be missing. Any equilibrium between differentiation and integration, the global/local dynamic, currently seems difficult to achieve in the Anglican Communion. The cultures of the national member churches each reflect elements of their national culture, and this differentiation is not compensated for by a corresponding integrative process as they share their practices with others. The “reverse missions” from the ex-colonies back to the “mother churches” in Britain and America tend to minister to immigrants. And, as I will describe, the recent rapprochement of English and American Calvinists with African Anglicans is a marriage of political convenience rather than any truly integrative process. Indeed, the Anglican Communion is being pulled apart by sectarian divisions.

The contrast of the C of E with the Roman Catholic Church is instructive. The latter has come to be recognized as a truly global institution. It realized that the nation state was a basic tool with which modernity had challenged the church (witness the constitutional separation of church
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from state in France and the USA). It therefore explicitly abandoned any pretence of established national status and embraced Enlightenment principles of human dignity, religious freedom, and self-determination. In a word, it represented itself as an element of global civil society, with the right to hold modernity to its promises. From the Second Vatican Council of 1962, and through a variety of Declarations such as *Dignitatis Humanae* and *Gaudium et Spes* (Joy and Hope), it has addressed ethical issues generally perceived as universal and global in their scope. These documents directly challenged governments and, sometimes, corporations. The Roman Catholic Church was thus acting as part of global society, since it was engaging with these other major global social sub-systems regarding global issues.

On the other hand, these Declarations were literally *ex cathedra* pronouncements. They did not involve much dialogue with other social systems, but rather made unilateral statements, ignoring the general modern distrust of institutions, particularly those of an authoritarian bent lacking in participation and accountability. Moreover, the Church’s integrative efforts within the global sub-system of religion, and the sub-sub-system of Christianity, have neither been conspicuous nor successful. On the contrary, the Church’s idea of “re-Christianizing” Europe still seems to have some currency, and it still demonstrates occasional authoritarian and even apparently dismissive attitudes towards other Christian institutions. It fails to participate fully in the World Council of Churches or more local examples of Christian unity such as the United Church of South India. This isolationist stance renders its global integration, at both the general religious and also the specifically Christian levels of social system, difficult to imagine. Thus while the Roman Catholic Church may itself be a global institution in its own right, its major contribution towards the globalization of the social systems of religion and of Christianity is less evident.

Nevertheless, the example of the Roman Catholic Church gives pause to the currently popular thesis that institutions are in general and terminal decline. Using the institutions of democracy as his canvas, Moises Naim argues that there is an ongoing redistribution of power away from institutions to more fluid, accountable, and democratic social forms such as social movements, with their high level of connectivity. But this view may reflect an insular late-modern or post-modern Western perspective, privileging

political social systems. More generally, one might argue that it is not so much the case that one form (institutions) is inevitably yielding place to another (movements) as that the success of each requires their mutual collaboration.

The C of E, then, cannot claim anything like the same degree of progress toward globalization as the Roman Catholic Church. It is demonstrably local in its history and preoccupations. Where it has broadened its horizons, these have largely been limited to the historical bounds of Empire, and integration with the disparate ex-colonial churches has proved very difficult. But what of the movements active within the C of E? How globalized are they? And will the Church's relationships with its movements enable it to firmly establish global connectivity, to achieve a global/local equilibrium, and to develop a conscious perception of itself as global? Alternatively, will they hinder this progress? For success or failure in these definitive tasks will determine its long-term future. To make any such global predictions, we must first examine carefully the local and particular, returning to the global only in the last chapter of the book. But first, we need to consider the recent history of the Calvinists and the Charismatics in order to put the present situation into context.