must begin this chapter with a disclaimer that my treatment of time is neither meant to be exhaustive nor to contribute to any scientific field. Rather, I am discussing a part of twentieth-century conceptions of time by which Lewis, Eliot, and Auden would create their works. The number of works influenced by twentieth-century theories of time is staggering, as is the size of the body of criticism on time in twentieth-century literature.¹ The question could thus be asked, why focus solely on the works of Bergson and not include works by other monumental figures, such as Samuel Alexander’s published lectures Space, Time, and Deity (1916–18); Wyndham Lewis’s critique of the metaphysical in writers Joyce and Pound as well as a refutation of Bergson in Time and Western Man (1927); and, arguably the most significant early twentieth-century work in the development of European philosophy, Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927)? The answer is that to deal with other philosophers as well as authors so important as Lewis or Eliot or Auden is simply beyond the scope of this work.

¹. E.g., Fabian, Time and the Other (1983); the theological look at time by Craig in Time and Eternity (2001); see also the helpful Hawking, A Brief History of Time (1988); Healey, ed., Reduction, Time and Reality (1981); McClure, ed., The Philosophy of Time (2005); Bazarnik, James Joyce and After: Writer and Time (2010); Whitworth, Einstein’s Wake: Relativity, Metaphor, and Modernist Literature (2002).
Moreover, Bergson’s subjectivizing of time to the level of conscious experience, his theory of dualistic selves operating in two types of time, and his notion of time as a force are explicitly put to use by the theological constructions of Lewis, Eliot, and Auden. Each Christian author appropriates Bergsonian philosophy to effectively articulate a theology of human experience in time that is both true to their Christian faiths and ideologically relevant to their audiences. As I have previously mentioned, it is not insignificant that Lewis, Eliot, and Auden chose to write theologies of time framed by Bergsonian concepts. One underlying contention of my project is that Lewis, Eliot, and Auden tailored their theological treatments of time according to the common currency of Bergonism because of the radical shift in religious ideology, the shift to more philosophically oriented theological orientation, and the emphasis on theological tenets like God’s revelation to man through extracanonical mediums (e.g., time). In other words, Bergson provided Lewis, Eliot, and Auden a relevant philosophical framework through which they could most effectively articulate their Christian theologies of time to a twentieth-century readership.

Thus, I am not trying to propose any new theories about conceptions of time in the early to middle twentieth century. Nor am I attempting to shed new light on Bergson; rather, my objective is to demonstrate how Bergson’s theory of duration influenced Lewis, Eliot, and Auden. So much of Bergson’s theory of time is about the inner states of the perceiver that the jump from Bergson to a Christian poetics—a jump based on inner spiritual experiences—is not a radical one. The relative subjectivity that Bergson championed in his philosophical treatments of time was absorbed, or even converted, through its theological appropriation by Lewis, Eliot, and Auden, who are ideologically indebted to Bergson. Their work bears signs of that debt through an acute awareness of and unique engagement with subjective time. In *The Great Divorce*, Lewis will create a multi-verse where time exists dualistically and moves in conjunction with characters’ spiritual development. Eliot’s *Four Quartets* will disturb notions of any objective correlation between the temporal and the eternal by inserting spiritual meaning into the experience of a moment, creating a dynamic force of time through which the Incarnation is made manifest. In “Kairos and Logos,” Auden will subjectivize time by dichotomizing the experiences of two types of selves: the unbelieving self that experiences time as being purely historical and the redeemed self that perceives time as theologically meaningful. Indeed, to convert the Bergsonian ideas of their age into theology, all three writers had to engage those ideas, and their
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works call attention back to the philosophical trends of their twentieth-century world.

Twentieth-Century Time and the Philosophy of Bergson

The turn of the twentieth century saw revolutionary changes in scientific and philosophical understandings of time. By the time that C. S. Lewis, T. S. Eliot, and W. H. Auden wrote their most significant Christian works, the metaphysical question of time had already been pressing upon the minds of the most prominent thinkers of the early twentieth century. As Paul Valery wrote in 1919, “the time has passed when time doesn’t count.”

From philosophy to the hard sciences, time was at the forefront of discussions about the nature of reality, about the perception of that reality, and about human existence itself.

The most influential scientific thinker of the early twentieth century, Albert Einstein, drastically shook the common, monolithic conceptions of time with his theories of Special Relativity (regarding the measurement of the speed of light in reference to various inertial frames) and General Relativity (generalizing special relativity by providing a unified definition of gravity as the province of space and time). In 1905, Einstein published his paper “On the Electrodynamic of Moving Bodies” that unfolded the principles of the Special Theory of Relativity, the one more immediately relevant to this study, a theory that proposes that two objects can exist and move in the universe in their own time in distinction from one another and also thus a theory that shifted emphasis to the relative position of the observer. When an event (e.g., a car crash) happens in one place, observers of that event would likely agree on the time that the event occurs. But when two events are separated by space (e.g., two different car crashes in the two cities of London and Memphis), the notion of a simultaneous point of impact is relative. Depending on the position of the observer—known as the frame of reference—the car crash in London might occur first, but in another frame of reference (i.e., in a different position of another observer) the car crash in Memphis may occur first. What happens at a certain time of day in London happens at a different time in Memphis because of the spatial position of those perceiving the event.

2. Valery, Complete Works 1.1045.
ity of the time of these occurring events negates any solidarity perceivers might have understanding the event.

To articulate his Special Theory of Relativity, Einstein uses an analogy of two strokes of lightning being witnessed by observers on a moving train and by witnesses on the embankment. Einstein considers the relativity of an event occurring simultaneously to more than one observer, asking, “Are two events (e.g., the two strokes of lightning A and B), which are simultaneous with reference to the railway embankment, also simultaneous relative to the train? We shall show directly that the answer must be negative.”\(^4\) Einstein then claims, “Events which are simultaneous with reference to the embankment are not simultaneous with respect to the train, and vice versa (relativity of simultaneity). Every reference-body (coordinate system) has its own particular time . . . .”\(^5\) This notion of each reference-body’s own particular time is the heart of Einsteinian relativity: that each object operates in the time relative to the perceiver in that perceiver’s particular vantage point, which may be different from the vantage point of a different perceiver.

In Bergson’s later theory of duration—i.e., of a subjective, conscious experience of time—he would develop what could be called a philosophical counterpart to Einstein’s relativity. Bergson’s entire conception of duration is built upon the premise that time exists, operates, and is experienced in ways as variously subjective as the human consciousness. For both Einstein and Bergson, the perception of time—i.e., one’s experience with time—defines time’s very nature. According to Einstein’s theory, time is far from absolute, monolithic, or independent from perception. Rather, time is only as verifiable, as capable of enumeration, and as uniform as those individuals experiencing it. Time was no longer only a scientific subject; it was a matter of experience and perception.\(^6\)

Whereas before Einstein space and time were understood as immutable absolutes under the dominant Newtonian model,\(^7\) after Einstein time was understood in relation to the perceiver. Describing absolute time, Newton posited that,

\(^4\) Einstein, *Relativity*, 22.

\(^5\) Ibid., 23.


\(^7\) For more on Newton’s absolute space and time, see Hugget and Hoefer’s entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-theories/#9.3; Hoefer, “Absolute Versus Relational Spacetime”; and Dicks, “Space-Time Relationism in Newtonian and Relativistic Physics.”
Absolute, true and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature flows equably without regard to anything external, and by another name is called duration: relative, apparent and common time, is some sensible and external (whether accurate or unequable) measure of duration by the means of motion, which is commonly used instead of true time; such as an hour, a day, a month, a year. . . .

Newton is careful to distinguish between two types of time, the absolute and the relative. It should be noted that Bergson will make the same type of dualistic move in his articulation of time, even using the same term “duration,” though Bergson’s ideas and Newton’s are quite different. Newton’s notion of absolute time is mathematical, objective, and, in comparison to relative time, “true.” Relative time, on the other hand, is a socially constructed measuring stick—a way of speaking about the absolute. Absolute time pays no attention to anything “external,” and the relationship of external perception to time is inconsequential, in that perception does nothing to define absolute time.

But through the lens of twentieth-century relativity, time is defined by the perception of time rather than the ontology of time, by the perceiv-er’s frame of reference rather than the reality of the hour, and by the relationships of one’s point of view with another’s within the temporal rather than temporal itself. Einstein’s theory of relativity marked a permanent change in how both time and space were understood. In the first decades of the twentieth century, the idea of time had radically changed; in terms of anyone’s understanding of time, the subjective perception joined the conceptual paradigm, displacing the original primacy of the mere event itself. Einstein made acceptable the notion of multiple coexistent spheres of time, establishing the concept of relative, subjective, impressionable time for the rest of the twentieth century. Indeed, Einstein built the conceptual house in which the thinking of Lewis, Eliot, Auden and the philosopher Henri Bergson would take up residence. An understanding of Bergson’s work on time is necessary for understanding how time was viewed in the early to middle twentieth century, and it is also necessary for an understanding of the ideologies of time with which Lewis, Eliot, and Auden’s worked. What Einstein meant for the science of time, Bergson meant for the philosophy of time.

Henri Bergson (1859–1941) was a French philosopher, chair of Greek and Latin Philosophy at the Collège de France, and the recipient

8. Newton, Mathematic Principles of Natural Philosophy, 6.
of the Nobel Prize in literature in 1927. Born in 1859, the same year that saw Darwin’s *Origin of Species*, Bergson would challenge Darwinism by promoting a philosophy of dynamism—a theoretical approach that emphasizes flux, movement, and immeasurable human experience—in opposition to the nineteenth-century science of mechanical determinism that Darwin helped solidify. Bergson’s popularity in the years leading up to Lewis, Eliot, and Auden’s conversions was immense. Bergson scholar Marguerite Bistis argues that Bergson “belonged to a particular type of French academic whom Terry Clark has aptly named ‘the mondain’ and whose defining characteristic is a profound rapport with the educated public.”

Bistis describes the *mondain* as individuals who act as “arbiter of the gout public” shaping the intellectual outlook and sensibility of their times. They tend to produce academic bestsellers which make them into celebrities on a par with politicians, writers, and actors. Like the institution with which they are usually but not always affiliated, they occupy the liminal space between the professional world of academe and the non-professional world of general culture.

Bergson was such a thinker, one who not only stood between the academy and culture but one whose ideas breached other intellectual disciplines. Bergson was, indeed, a “mondain,” whose works like *Time and Free Will*, *Matter and Memory*, and *Creative Evolution* were widely popular through Europe, even pervading the intellectual discourses of Lewis, Eliot, and Auden’s England. When Bergson’s theories emerged at the onset of the twentieth century, one factor that led to his popularity was that his philosophy did what philosophical systems were not supposed to do. It questioned the supremacy of human reason.

It will be made clear in this chapter that what Bergson valued most was an intuitive, even spiritual, experience with time that is not informed by empiricism or scientific rationality. The focus of this chapter will largely be on *Time and Free Will* (1889; English edition, 1910), a text that mounts an attack on atomistic views of mental states and time and supports an metaphysical understanding of time working in synthesis with an intuitive view of mental states, which Bergson call *intensities*. What Bergson will offer twentieth-century thought is a new way of understanding the

10. Ibid.
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intensities of the human condition and how they are manifested through
time and acted on by it.

Time, Bergson argues, has been misunderstood by the scientific
rationality so prominent to the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
century:

Time could be enormously and even infinitely accelerated;
nothing would be changed for the mathematician, for the physi-
cist or for the astronomer. And yet the difference with regard
to consciousness would be profound . . . for consciousness, the
weariness of waiting, from one day to the next, from one hour
to another, would no longer be the same.11

Bergson’s point is that nothing would change in scientific rationality
if the value of time were changed. If time were accelerated or halted, it
would merely be a matter of notation to the scientific mind. However, to
the consciousness, time is felt.

Time molds the conscious mind, acting on it and transforming
into another state of consciousness through what Bergson will describe
as the “force” of time. Bergson will even go so far in his philosophy of
time to ascribe the force behind duration (time) and one’s life in dura-
tion as “an eternity of life.”12 Bergson claims to believe in an eternity of
life that transcends both time and temporal experience, but which can
be accessed through an intuitive knowledge of duration. It is this reach
past the scientific toward the metaphysical that makes Bergson so employ-
able by Lewis, Eliot, and Auden. While Bergson never goes so far as to
espouse a Christian view of time such as articulated by Lewis, Eliot, and
Auden, his theories are a middle ground between non-Christian philoso-
phies (e.g., positivism or scientific mechanism) and Christian theology.
More so than the thinking of any other twentieth-century thinker on time,
Bergson’s philosophies provide a sort of metaphysical via media between
twentieth-century philosophy and the Christian theologies of Lewis, Eliot,
and Auden.

One element important in Bergson’s influence on twentieth-century
conceptions of time was his philosophical continuation of Einsteinian rel-
ativity. Bergson furthered Einstein’s principle of relativity and pushed for
dynamic, innumerable understandings of how an event occurred in time.

12. Ibid., 176.
When you raise your arms, you accomplish a movement of which you have, from within, a simple perception; but for me, watching it from the outside, your arm passes through one point, then through another, and between these two there will still be other points; so that if you begin to count, the operation would go on for ever. Viewed from the inside, then, an absolute is a simple thing; but looked at from the outside it is [subject to] an inexhaustible enumeration.13

Bergson's argument that being outside an event produces innumerable understandings derives from Einstein's analogy of a flash of light being seen by numerous viewers in various frames of reference. By focusing on the infinite understandings inherent in perception, Bergson's theories would expand philosophical understandings of the perception of an event in relation to the actual event perceived. In terms of time, Bergson would seek to expand the very notion of successive moments and of human perception of those moments, as well as of the concept of knowing in time. In doing so, he would apply an epistemological paradigm with Einstein's faint fingerprints on it. Like Einstein's theory of special relativity, Bergson's theory of time approaches the phenomenon of an experienced moment from the perceiver's perspective and so expands the definition of time to include multi-dimensional understandings, all relative to the observer. Unlike the ideas of his scientific forebear Einstein, Bergson's claims were explicitly philosophical and always supported by the “inexhaustible enumeration” of a theory rather than by mechanistic, empirical evidence. But, just as Einstein proposed his theory of relativity against the antithetical backdrop of Newtonian concepts of time, so Bergson proposed his vitalistic theories of duration (time) and intuition (consciousness in time) against an inimical philosophical milieu dominated by the influences of determinist positivism.

As a worldview, positivism held sway over the areas of philosophy, science, and psychology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Positivism was an extension of Darwinian determinism that swept the fields of science, psychology, and philosophy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Positivism sought to explain every facet of human existence through the mechanical language of science. According to this school of thought, all phenomena pertaining to human life and nature occur prescriptively by the determined conditions of the cosmos, and all phenomena are adequately accounted for by scientific method. Auguste


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Comte, founder of the philosophy of positivism, declared all areas of human life under the domain of natural science:

Now that man’s history has been for the first time systematically considered as a whole, and has been found to be, like all other phenomena, subject to invariable laws, the preparatory labours of modern Science are ended. All knowledge is now brought within the sphere of Natural Philosophy. . . . A firm objective basis is laid down for that complete co-ordination of human existence towards which all sound Philosophy has ever tended.  

Comte’s assumption that all facets of the human experience were thoroughly accounted for by modern science saturated the latter half of the nineteenth century. Comte’s pronouncements were extended by Hippolyte Taine, literary critic and advocate of social positivism, who extended scientific processes to the subject of psychology. Taine declares that science has conquered nature and now accounts for the human condition:

Science approaches at last and approaches man; it has gone beyond the visible and palpable world of stars, stones, and plants, to which it had been contemptuously confined—it now challenges the soul, armed with exact and piercing instruments whose precision and whose reach have proved themselves over three hundred years of experience.

Taine’s presumption about the ability of science to assimilate human nature through its “piercing instruments” speaks to the spirit of the age, an age that sought “to push science to its ultimate limits,” as wrote French philosopher, theologian, and famed nineteenth-century progressive thinker Ernest Renan in The Future of Science.  

Like the physical sciences of the era, late nineteenth-century psychology saw the human soul as the province of science and so held it to be quantifiable.

In the realm of biological science, Herbert Spencer likewise championed the positivist doctrine of mechanical evolution. Even before Darwin’s Origin of Species, Spencer’s essay “Progress: Its Law and Cause” (1857) promoted an adaptive form of evolution through which the human race has steadily progressed to a type of epistemological teleology, an ultimate state of knowing. This evolutionary concept of epistemology was further promoted in the essay’s fuller version First Principles of a New System

of Philosophy (1862). Spencer held science to be “an organized body of truths, ever growing, and ever being purified of errors.”\(^\text{17}\) Spencer’s notion of science’s “ever growing” progressive nature reveals an utter faith in the empirical processes of science. In fact, Spencer went so far as to foretell that the “veritable revelation” of science would continually disclose the “established order of the Universe.”\(^\text{18}\) Spencer saw the rationalist state of the nineteenth century as the culmination of the human epistemological journey: “mechanistic science of the last century represents the last stage of the adaptive process by which the human mind gradually adjusts itself to the structure of reality.”\(^\text{19}\) It was on this “last stage” that Bergson would emerge to counter the Darwinian philosophies of Comte, Taine, and Spencer.

The denunciation of Darwinian science along with its promotion of philosophies of mechanistic determinism constituted the core of Bergson’s philosophical agenda. According to Bergson, the biggest problem with Darwinian thinking was its incapability to account for the dynamic, the “becoming” nature of life:

Science has nothing to change in what it tells us, we must conclude that, in what it tells us, it takes account neither of succession in what of it is specific nor of time in what there is in it that is fluent. It has no sign to express what strikes our consciousness in succession and duration. It no more applies to becoming, so far as that is moving, than the bridges thrown here and there across the stream follow the water that flows under their arches.\(^\text{20}\)

This accusation of science’s inability to account for the processes of life is important for Bergson’s own thinking. According to Bergson, no system of thought is adequate if it cannot explain dynamic natural change. Science cannot explain time, evolution, or the human condition because the mechanistic philosophy on which nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-century scientific inquiry is built will not allow for life’s volatile nature. To use a Bergsonesque metaphor, the dams of science stop the flowing waters of life. Bergson’s critique of science’s inability to express “duration”—the name Bergson gave to his theory of time—is particularly important for this present work and will be the focus of the second half of

18. Ibid.
19. Capek, Bergson and Modern Physics, 10.
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this chapter. It could be said that Bergson’s entire philosophical trajectory can be traced along the reactionary lines against Darwinian influenced philosophies.21

Bergson’s body of work is replete with indictments against any system of thought that promotes mechanistic finalism. Important to understand in Bergson’s criticism is his rejection of the determinist philosophy in Darwinian mechanistic science. And, indeed, when the ideas inherent in Darwinian evolution bleed into other disciplines, as they do in Taine’s psychology, Bergson has much to say: “The error of radical finalism, as also that of radical mechanism, is to extend too far the application of certain concepts that are natural to our intellect”;22 “Bound, like the physics of the moderns and the metaphysics of the ancients, to the cinematographical method, it ended with the conclusion, implicitly admitted at the start and immanent in the method itself: All is given”;23 “Never could the finalistic interpretation, such as we shall propose it, be taken for an anticipation of the future. It is a particular mode of viewing the past in the light of the present. In short, the classic conception of finality postulates at once too much and too little: it is both too wide and too narrow. In explaining life by intellect, it limits too much meaning of life.”24 Each of these passages share a common critique of science’s finalistic assumption that life can be blueprinted down to its ultimate end. In Bergson’s dynamism, no such assumption made, and in his theory of duration, all is not given. Yet in all of his engagements with scientific discourse, Bergson wrote with refreshingly anti-empirical illustration, often drawing on the most metaphysical, emotional, and even spiritual analogies to reconceptualize time and promote a dynamic theory of life.

To have a fuller understanding of Bergson, one must appreciate that he wrote in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the scientific as well as philosophical discussion of vitalism was a major point of contention.25 Vitalism is a philosophy that holds that the functions of

21. For more on Bergson’s response to mechanical determinism and the twentieth-century’s move to more indeterminist philosophies, see Guerlac’s helpful chapter, “From the Certainties of Mechanism to the Anxieties of Indeterminism” in Thinking in Time, 14–41.
23. Ibid., 172.
24. Ibid., 34.
25. For more on Bergson and vitalism, see Schwartz’s “Bergson and the Politics of Vitalism,” 277–305.
an organism are caused by a vital principle—or as Bergson put it, an *élan vital*, or a “vital impulse”—separate from biochemical catalysts. Vitalism proposes that because life is organic and ever flourishing it cannot be reduced to governing mechanistic laws. Vitalism also insists that neither physics nor any other physical science can account for the processes of life. Vitalism posited that human experiences and actions cannot be explained in mechanistic terms, though the scientific tendency to explain life in automated, ironically lifeless terms had bled over into the realm of philosophy. Philosophical vitalism—often called *Lebensphilosophie* (“philosophy of life”—emerged in response to positivism and its application of scientifically physical language to describe human experience.26 Opposed to the static scientific diagnosis of positivism, the essential tenet of vitalism is its emphasis on progressive dynamism. Fixity is antithetical to life, according to vitalistic principles, and becoming is superior to being. As Schwartz points out, it is precisely vitalism’s emphasis on dynamic change, multiplicity, and becoming that made it an appealing alternative to religion for secularists, who could not reduce life to the mechanical projections of positivism.27 It is at the point of divorce between the determinist leanings of positivism and vitalism’s promotion of the dynamic that Bergson would insert his theories of creative evolution and time duration. Bergson, who viewed life as a constant process of growth and change that perpetually produces new forms, would be one of vitalism’s greatest proponents and positivism’s greatest opponents.

Indeed, life was for Bergson “a constant state of becoming”—a concept he coined as “creative evolution.” From the most subjective human experience to the overall order of the cosmos, every facet of natural life is in dynamic flux. Inherent in existence is change, “Organic creation . . . the evolutionary phenomena which properly constitute life, we cannot in any way subject to a mathematical treatment.”28 Contrary to Darwin’s mechanistic evolution, Bergson’s position is that the process of evolution moves along according to a vital impetus (*élan vital*), and that all life develops dynamically and leads to a dynamically open end, as opposed to a mechanistic teleology in which “all is given.”29

27. Ibid., 573.
29. Ibid., 34. For more on Bergson’s treatment of mechanistic scientific systems, see ibid., 10–55.
The truth is we change without ceasing. . . . [T]here is no essential difference between passing from one state to another and persisting in the same state. If the state which “remains the same” is more varied than we think, [then] on the other hand the passing of one state to another resembles—more than we imagine—a single state being prolonged: the transition is continuous. Just because we close our eyes to the unceasing variation of every physical state, we are obliged when the change has become so formidable as to force itself on our attention, to speak as if a new state were placed alongside the previous one. Of this new state we assume that it remains unvarying in its turn and so on endlessly.30

Bergson’s diction (“change without ceasing, passing, transition is continuous, unceasing variation, force, endlessly”) captures his overall philosophy of the nature of life: to live is change. Existence itself is more aptly described as becoming rather than being. Existence is dynamic change, an ever becoming and never static process. Bergson says of human existence, “We are seeking only the precise meaning that our consciousness gives to this word “exist” and we find that, for a conscious being, to exist is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating oneself endlessly.”31 Bergson developed a philosophical system in which an endless natural dynamism is the foundation for understanding the human condition. This vital philosophy of life is important for Lewis’s fiction and for the poetry of Eliot and Auden, as each author creates worlds of progressive morality and dynamic being. All three writers resist existential fixity (e.g., Lewis’s moral dynamism and the theme of transformative time in Eliot and Auden’s verse) and, by relying on Bergsonian thought, construct theological worlds in which both man and time interrelate. This ever-changing existence in which the orders of nature, of human experiences, and of human knowledge adhere to unpredictable processes of change is a central tenet to Bergson’s thinking. Both life and even man’s knowledge of life are subject to the experiences inherent in a dynamic, evolving world.